Photo Courtesy: images.thedailystar.net
April, 01, 2025
The Changing Course of River Teesta
Bangladesh’s proposal to include China in the Teesta Project indicates a change in its geopolitical alliances. Previously relying on Indian support for water management and energy projects, Dhaka’s decision to involve Beijing reflects an effort to diversify its international partnerships. The Teesta River, which frequently causes tensions between Bangladesh and India, represents the complex nature of regional water diplomacy. By involving China, Bangladesh aims to utilize China’s infrastructural expertise and financial resources to address water distribution issues and lessen its reliance on its neighbour (India). This engagement highlights a strategic shift, emphasizing Bangladesh’s commitment to the One China policy and its approach to regional power dynamics. Bangladesh aims to support a multipolar regional order and manage its resources more effectively as alliances shift and economic priorities change.
History, Negotiations & Development
The Teesta River, crucial for India and Bangladesh, has been a point of conflict and opportunity since the 1947 partition of British India and Bangladesh’s emergence in 1971. The river originates in Sikkim, flows through West Bengal, and enters Bangladesh, where it plays a crucial role in agriculture, particularly for rice and jute cultivation, and supports hydropower generation in West Bengal. Historically, the lack of a formal water-sharing agreement left both nations grappling with the river’s seasonal fluctuations. An interim agreement in 1983 allocated 39% of the dry-season water to India and 36% to Bangladesh. However, this arrangement was never fully backed, leaving unresolved issues that continued to fuel tensions. A renewed attempt came in 2011 with a draft treaty proposing revised shares of 42.5% for India and 37.5% for Bangladesh. The deal failed when West Bengal’s Chief Minister, Mamata Banerjee, expressed concerns over water security for the state, thus extending the deadlock and heightening Bangladesh’s objections.
In response to the ongoing dispute and the critical need for water security, Bangladesh conceptualized the Teesta River Comprehensive Management and Restoration Project an ambitious initiative designed to mitigate the adverse impacts of the Teesta’s irregular flow and bolster economic stability through a multi-faceted approach. Central to the project is integrated water management, which involves constructing barrages, reservoirs, and canals to regulate water supply, control floods, and ensure a more consistent and equitable distribution during the dry season. The project is strategically oriented toward supporting agriculture in the fertile northern regions of Bangladesh, where reliable water availability is essential for rice and cash crops like jute. By safeguarding livelihoods and enhancing food security, and through improved hydrological forecasting coupled with robust flood control measures, the initiative also aims to reduce the annual damage caused by monsoonal flooding thereby protecting both lives and property.
India’s limited engagement with Bangladesh’s proposals has pushed Dhaka to seek alternative partners, notably China. Chinese support for the Teesta Project carries substantial geopolitical weight, potentially shifting South Asia’s strategic balance and reducing India’s regional influence. Ultimately, the Teesta Project reflects Bangladesh’s resolve to secure its water resources and economic future despite persistent diplomatic challenges, suggesting that a comprehensive solution may require innovative regional cooperation or even multilateral frameworks involving India, Bangladesh, and China to achieve equitable water sharing and sustainable development.
Inviting China & Embracing One China Policy
Bangladesh’s diplomatic approach has notably shifted since the fall of Sheikh Hasina’s government. Under interim leadership by Chief Adviser Muhammad Yunus, Dhaka is actively diversifying its international ties particularly by strengthening relations with China. In March 2025, Yunus made his first bilateral state visit to China, where he met with President Xi Jinping. The discussions centred on enhancing cooperation across multiple sectors, with Xi affirming China’s commitment to support Bangladesh’s interim government and assuring to boost Chinese investment, including facilitating the relocation of Chinese manufacturing enterprises to Bangladesh.
During Yunus’ visit, Bangladesh highlighted the Teesta River Comprehensive Management and Restoration Project (TRCMRP) as a solution to its prolonged water-sharing deadlock with India. In a bid to secure both financial and technical backing, Bangladesh invited China to join the project, expecting substantial investments from Beijing. In parallel, China has pledged $400 million to modernize Mongla Port boosting Bangladesh’s trade logistics and an additional $350 million to develop a China Industrial Economic Zone, aimed at attracting Chinese manufacturers and transforming Bangladesh into a burgeoning manufacturing hub in South Asia.
In a notable policy shift, Bangladesh has reaffirmed its commitment to the One China Policy, recognizing the People’s Republic of China as the sole legitimate government, including its claim over Taiwan. This confirmation was conveyed during Yunus’ visit, signalling a deeper alignment with Beijing amid escalating global tensions over Taiwan. By supporting the One China Policy, Bangladesh positions itself to secure increased Chinese investments and favourable economic terms, including potential reductions in interest rates on Chinese loans. This move indicates a shift away from India’s sphere of influence, aligning Bangladesh more closely with China’s regional strategy and reflecting Dhaka’s intent to diversify its diplomatic engagements.
Strategic Waters
Bangladesh’s prioritization of the Teesta River, despite having the vast water resources of the Ganga and Brahmaputra, due regional disparities in water distribution. While the southern regions benefit from the massive flows of the Ganga and Brahmaputra, the northern districts of Bangladesh remain perennially water stressed. During the dry season, these areas rely heavily on the Teesta River, which, unfortunately, is subject to upstream control by India. This control has led to severe shortages and heightened concerns over water security, prompting Dhaka to look beyond traditional partnerships and seek diplomatic and infrastructural support from China.
From China’s perspective, involvement in the Teesta project is part of a broader strategy to expand its influence across South Asia. Beijing views its investment in water resource management and infrastructure as an opportunity to cement its presence in India’s neighbourhood. This approach aligns closely with China’s Belt and Road Initiative, wherein water diplomacy is used as a tool to enhance connectivity and foster economic ties. By extending its influence in Bangladesh through projects like the (TRCMRP), China aims to replicate its success in other regional partners, such as Sri Lanka, Nepal, and Pakistan.
For India, the implications of China’s growing involvement in Bangladesh’s water resources are complex and concerning. First, China’s active participation in the Teesta project threatens to erode India’s traditional strategic leverage over Bangladesh, a relationship that India has long depended upon for regional influence. With China stepping in as a significant economic and technical partner, India’s historical dominance in the subcontinent may face a serious setback.
Moreover, the increased Chinese presence in this sensitive border region raises security concerns for New Delhi. The possibility of enhanced military and intelligence cooperation between China and Bangladesh, especially near the strategically crucial chicken neck area, could have adverse implications for India’s national security. The chicken neck, a narrow corridor critical to India’s connectivity with its northeastern states, could become a flashpoint if further Chinese influence results in a rebalancing of regional alliances. The competitive dynamics of economic and diplomatic investments in the region mean that India may be forced to counterbalance Chinese offers with its own proposals. This could involve bolstering trade, infrastructure, and defence collaborations with Bangladesh.
Revive, Rebuild, Rebalance
Bangladesh is strengthening its ties with China, especially in key areas like water management and infrastructure. This shift challenges India’s influence in the region. The ongoing dispute over sharing water from the Teesta River is a major issue between the two countries, and China’s readiness to fund water projects in Bangladesh has increased Dhaka’s frustration with New Delhi. To balance China’s growing role in Bangladesh, India needs to be more active in diplomacy, work more closely with its neighbours, and adjust its domestic policies.
One of the primary ways for India to rebuild trust with Bangladesh is to restart negotiations on the Teesta water-sharing agreement. Bangladesh’s growing dependence on China lessens its dissatisfaction with India’s reluctance to finalize a fair deal. While domestic political challenges in West Bengal have stalled the treaty, a renewed commitment to resolving the issue could prevent further separation of Bangladesh. If India does not act decisively, China’s involvement in the Teesta project could become a permanent strategic loss for New Delhi. Beyond water-sharing, India must expand its economic ties with Bangladesh by offering better trade incentives and investing in cross-border infrastructure projects. Strengthening road, rail, and port connectivity especially through initiatives like the India-Bangladesh Friendship Pipeline and the Agartala-Akhaura rail link can deepen economic integration. This will help reinforce Bangladesh’s economic dependence on India, reducing the appeal of Chinese investments.
India should utilize regional organizations like the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) and the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC) to push for cooperative water resource management. A multilateral approach could provide Bangladesh with regional alternatives, reducing the perception that India is solely responsible for its water issues. Such an approach would also diminish the need for Chinese intervention. India could involve international water law experts or engage with global organizations like the International Court of Arbitration (ICA) or the United Nations Water Convention to mediate water-sharing disputes. This would not only add legitimacy to India’s approach but also demonstrate a commitment to transparent and fair resource management.
West Bengal’s opposition to the Teesta treaty has been a major roadblock in India’s negotiations with Bangladesh. New Delhi must engage with West Bengal’s leadership, particularly Chief Minister Mamata Banerjee, and local farmers to address their concerns. Offering compensation for potential water shortages, investing in alternative irrigation projects, and ensuring sustainable water management could help secure their cooperation. India should improve its water retention and distribution systems, particularly in West Bengal and Sikkim, to ensure that both Indian and Bangladeshi needs can be met. Constructing additional reservoirs, improving irrigation efficiency, and implementing advanced hydrological monitoring systems could create a surplus of water that allows for a more generous treaty with Bangladesh.
Insights from Global Case Studies
Ganga Water Treaty (India-Bangladesh, 1996)
Transboundary water disputes offer valuable and diplomatic lessons that can inform the Teesta debate. The 1996 Ganga Water Treaty between India and Bangladesh is often cited as a successful model of water cooperation. It employs a formula-based allocation derived from historical flow data (1949–1988), dividing water between the two countries in predefined 10-day cycles during the dry season. Its design includes monitoring mechanisms such as a Joint Committee responsible for real-time flow assessments and emergency consultations when flows dip below 50,000 cusecs. While its reliance on historical averages has drawn criticism amid changing climatic conditions, its framework and bilateral dialogue set a pattern for structured water sharing.
Mekong River Dispute (China and Southeast Asia)
In contrast, the Mekong River dispute highlights challenges of managing water resources when a dominant upstream country in this case, China controls major dam projects. China’s construction of dams along the Lancang (Upper Mekong) alters flow regimes, affecting sediment transport and disrupting fisheries downstream in countries like Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam. Unlike the Ganga Treaty, the Mekong lacks a broad binding agreement; instead, regional cooperation is attempted through platforms like the Lancang-Mekong Cooperation framework. Here, issues such as hydrological modelling, sediment management, and ecological impacts are intensified by geopolitical leverage, showing the complexity when power inequality exist.
Nile River Conflict (Egypt, Ethiopia, Sudan)
The Nile River conflict between Egypt, Ethiopia, and Sudan offers another instructive case. Ethiopia’s construction of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam has sparked debates over upstream development versus downstream water security. The dam-induced alterations in sediment load, changes in evaporation rates from large reservoirs, and precise forecasting of flow volumes are critical in determining water availability. International cooperation and multilateral negotiations underpinned by established legal principles, like equitable and reasonable utilization, have been proposed as paths to resolution.
Together, these disputes underscore the need for robust hydrological data, adaptive management strategies that consider environmental flows, and clear dispute resolution mechanisms. They demonstrate that while technical solutions can provide frameworks for water sharing, their success centres on the political will of the riparian states and the fairness of negotiated terms.
Changing Currents
Bangladesh’s decision to invite China into the Teesta Project is a defining moment in South Asian geopolitics. While it promises economic gains for Bangladesh, it also raises concerns about China’s expanding influence in India’s traditional sphere of dominance. The deepening Bangladesh-China partnership, reinforced by diplomatic and economic initiatives, is reshaping regional dynamics.
For India, this shift demands a strategic recalibration. By reviving stalled negotiations, engaging Bangladesh economically, and addressing domestic concerns over water-sharing, India can mitigate the risks of losing a long-standing ally. Meanwhile, Bangladesh must carefully navigate its newfound reliance on China to avoid falling into a dependency trap. As the Teesta waters continue to flow, so too does the shifting balance of power in South Asia leading in a new chapter in regional diplomacy.
Diversions of river is mandatory