India Puts Indus water Treaty on Hold! Can this bring Pakistan to Knees?

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The News

On April 22, 2025, terrorists from a group calling itself “Kashmir Resistance” an off shoot of Laskar-e-Taiba attacked tourists in Pahalgam, Jammu & Kashmir, killing 26 people (25 Indian and one Nepali) and injuring 17 others in the worst civilian massacre in the region since 2008. The following day, Prime Minister Narendra Modi cut short his trip from Saudi Arabia, convened the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS), and announced a suite of retaliatory measures: closure of the Attari border crossing, downgrading diplomatic ties, cancelling visa-exemption schemes for Pakistani citizens, expelling Pakistani military advisers, and most notably, suspending its obligations under the Indus Water Treaty (IWT) “in abeyance with immediate effect, until Pakistan credibly and irrevocably abjures its support for cross-border terrorism.” India’s Foreign Secretary, Vikram Misri, accused Pakistan’s intelligence agencies of involvement. Islamabad vehemently denied any state sponsorship, calling the suspension “an excuse to abandon a hard-won peace instrument”

The Facts

India has suspended the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) with Pakistan for the first time since its signing in 1960, following a deadly terror attack in Pahalgam that killed 26 people; the suspension is meant to pressure Pakistan to end support for cross-border terrorism.
The IWT, brokered by the World Bank, divided the Indus river system: India received exclusive rights over the eastern rivers (Ravi, Beas, Sutlej), while Pakistan was allocated the western rivers (Indus, Jhelum, Chenab), which supply about 80% of Pakistan’s irrigation water.
The treaty has been a rare example of sustained cooperation, surviving wars and diplomatic crises for over six decades, ensuring predictability and stability of water flows between the two countries.
India’s suspension of the treaty removes restrictions on its use of the western rivers, allowing it to potentially build storage, alter river flows, and stop sharing water flow data with Pakistan.
Pakistan is highly vulnerable to any disruption, as about 80% of its cultivated land, roughly 16 million hectares relies on the Indus system for irrigation, and 93% of its water is used for agriculture.
Major Pakistani cities, including Karachi, Lahore, and Multan, depend on Indus waters for drinking and municipal use; any cut in supply could lead to water scarcity and social unrest.
Pakistan has a low water storage capacity and is already among the most water-stressed countries globally; any interruption in river flows could exacerbate food insecurity, lower crop yields, and threaten economic stability.
Historically, Pakistan has accused India of violating the treaty and has sought international arbitration, including the Permanent Court of Arbitration and the World Bank, over Indian hydroelectric projects on the western rivers.
India’s move is seen as a major escalation and a shift in its approach, as previous calls to “revisit” the treaty after terror attacks did not result in formal suspension; this time, India is leveraging its upper riparian position for strategic and diplomatic pressure.
The suspension could trigger diplomatic escalation, legal challenges, and international mediation, with significant and potentially disastrous implications for Pakistan’s water, agriculture, energy, and urban sectors.

2. What is Indus Waters Treaty? What are the Origins and Objectives?

2.1 Signing and Signatories

Negotiations over the Indus basin began in 1948 after partition created riparian tensions: though the headwaters lay in Indian territory, most irrigation canals served Pakistani Punjab. Multiple interim accords failed to yield a permanent settlement. In 1951, former TVA Chairman David Lilienthal proposed World Bank mediation, leading to nine years of talks and, ultimately, the IWT’s signing in Karachi on September 19, 1960, by Indian PM Jawaharlal Nehru, Pakistani President Ayub Khan, and World Bank Vice President William Illiff. The World Bank became a signatory (not guarantor), tasked with appointing neutral experts or chairing PCA tribunals under treaty dispute provisions.

The move by India to suspend its commitments under the IWT has raised concerns about the potential impact on Pakistan, a country heavily reliant on the waters of the Indus River system for its agricultural and economic needs.

2.2 Objectives and Requirements

The treaty’s raison d’être was to defuse water-related conflict and promote development. It partitions six rivers: three eastern rivers (Ravi, Beas, Sutlej) for exclusive use by India, and three western rivers (Indus, Jhelum, Chenab) for Pakistan; India paid £62 million to Pakistan for constructing replacement headworks and canal systems, fulfilling this obligation in ten annual instalments despite the 1965 war. Both countries commit to data exchange, annual inspections, and mechanisms for notification of new works (Article III).

3. What are the Key Provisions of the Treaty?

Water Allocation: Article I divides Eastern and Western rivers between riparians, Eastern to India, Western to Pakistan, while permitting limited “non-consumptive uses” (hydropower, navigation, flood control) upstream of the international border.
Permanent Indus Commission (PIC): A binational body with one commissioner from each country meets annually (Article VIII) to review data, inspect works, and pre-empt disputes; remarkably, the PIC has operated uninterrupted through four wars.
Dispute Resolution: Differences over technical parameters use a neutral expert (Annex F), while disputes on interpretation or breach proceed to a Court of Arbitration (Annex G). The World Bank appoints these neutrals or CoA chairs.
Transition Period: A ten-year phase (1960–1970) required India to continue supplying Eastern-river water to Pakistan until Pakistan built its canal network for Western rivers; this transition remained inviolate even during the 1965 war.
Financial Provisions: Article V obliges India to contribute to Pakistan’s replacement works cost (62 million British Pound), reflecting an early cost-sharing principle.
Annexures A–H: Detail permissible designs, reservoir levels, diversion limits, and sediment management rules for hydroelectric and irrigation structures.

4. What has been Pakistan’s Legal Responses to Alleged Treaty Violations?

Since the early 2000s, Pakistan has repeatedly accused India of stretching IWT boundaries through upstream hydroelectric projects. Key instances include:

4.1 Baglihar Hydroelectric Project (2005–2007)

Project Details: Two-stage run-of-river scheme on the Chenab River with 450 MW capacity per stage; Stage I (450 MW) commissioned in 2008, Stage II in 2015.
Dispute: Pakistan objected that India’s dam design (spillway capacity, gated outlets) allowed strategic flow control beyond treaty allowances, posing security risks.
Resolution: Under Annex F, the World Bank-appointed Neutral Expert ruled in India’s favor in December 2007, allowing certain design parameters but mandating design amendments for flood spillways; both sides accepted the decision.

4.2 Kishanganga (Neelum) Hydroelectric Project (2009–2013)

Project Details: 37 m concrete-face rock-fill dam diverting 58.4 m³/s through a 23.2 km tunnel to a 330 MW underground plant; commissioned in May 2018.
Dispute: Pakistan claimed that diversion reduced downstream flow critically for its Neelum–Jhelum project; India maintained compliance with minimum flow obligations (9 m³/s).
Resolution: In February 2013, PCA delivered its award, permitting India’s run-of-river design but enforcing downstream minimum flow and banning depletion of dead storage.

4.3 Ratle Hydroelectric Plant (2011–ongoing)

Project Details: Under-construction 133 m gravity dam on the Chenab, 4×205 MW + 1×30 MW (850 MW total), with active storage 23.86 M m³; expected online by 2026.
Dispute: Pakistan alleges India’s proposed pondage, gated spillways, and low-level outlets violate Annex D’s limits on pondage (3 days), sediment outlets, and gate positions.
Legal Steps: Simultaneous proceedings under Annex F (neutral expert appointed in October 2022) and Annex G (Request for Arbitration filed August 2016) are underway, with competence awards delivered in July 2023 and neutral expert’s initial decisions in January 2025.

4.4 Tulbul/Naval Bund Project (Wullar Barrage) and Salal Dam

Tulbul Project (Wullar Barrage): Pending clearance since 1987 over navigational lock design; Pakistan alleges treaty violation due to storage capacity beyond emergency flood releases.
Salal Dam (1978): Built by India after mutual agreement; Pakistan raised no objections, illustrating cooperative treaty application.

5. What has been India’s Historical Stance on the IWT?

5.1 Enduring Commitment and Early Reservations

India originally resisted third-party arbitration, preferring bilateral resolution, but acquiesced to World Bank mediation to resolve stalemated talks. Despite the 1965 war, India honored treaty payments and flows, underscoring its view of the IWT as a cornerstone of regional stability.

5.2 India’s Stand on the Indus Water Treaty in the Last 20 Years

In the last two decades, India’s stance on the Indus Water Treaty has evolved in response to changing geopolitical dynamics and domestic priorities. The following points highlight India’s position in recent years:

5.1. Strategic Use of Water: India has increasingly viewed water as a strategic resource and has sought to leverage its control over the Indus River system to influence Pakistan’s behavior. This approach was evident in the aftermath of the Uri attack in 2016, when India announced a review of the IWT.

5.2. Development Projects: India has accelerated the construction of hydroelectric projects on the western rivers, such as the Kishanganga and Ratle projects, to meet its growing energy needs. These projects have been a source of contention with Pakistan, which views them as a threat to its water security.

5.3. Diplomatic Engagement: India has engaged with Pakistan through the Permanent Indus Commission and other diplomatic channels to address disputes and maintain the treaty’s integrity. However, these efforts have been hampered by the broader political tensions between the two countries.

5.4. Public Statements: Indian political leaders have made public statements emphasizing India’s rights under the IWT and warning Pakistan against using the treaty as a tool for political leverage. These statements have been seen as a signal of India’s willingness to take a more assertive stance on water issues.

5.5 Recent Developments: Assertive but Procedural

In September 2024, India formally sought IWT review, alleging Pakistan’s repeated misuses of Himalayan tributaries and excessive groundwater pumping upstream of Pakistan’s portion—a claim Pakistan rebuffed as inconsistent with treaty procedures. On January 1, 2025, the neutral expert in the Ratle proceedings affirmed his competence to hear India’s design objections, marking a procedural victory for New Delhi .

6. What could be the Potential Impacts of Suspension of IWT on Pakistan?

6.1 Agricultural Vulnerability

Pakistan’s agricultural sector stands to be the most severely impacted by any disruption to the Indus water flow. Approximately 80% of Pakistan’s irrigated land depends on the Indus river system, making it existentially dependent on these waters.
Any reduction in water availability could significantly reduce yields of key crops that form the backbone of Pakistan’s agricultural economy and food security infrastructure.
The timing of water releases is particularly critical for Pakistan’s agricultural planning. Regulated releases from hydroelectric projects like Kishanganga and Ratle help maintain consistent water availability during peak agricultural seasons. With the treaty suspended, India may halt these regulated releases, potentially creating seasonal water shortages even if natural flows continue.

6.2 Energy Security Challenges

Pakistan’s energy infrastructure also depends significantly on the Indus system, with hydroelectric plants generating a substantial portion of the country’s electricity. Reduced or irregular water flows could undermine power generation capacity, exacerbating Pakistan’s already challenging energy security situation.
The western rivers, particularly the Jhelum and Chenab, support critical hydroelectric infrastructure in Pakistan. Any alteration to the flow regimes of these rivers could necessitate operational adjustments at these facilities, potentially reducing their efficiency and output.

6.3 Economic Repercussions

The combined agricultural and energy impacts could trigger broader economic consequences for Pakistan’s already fragile economy. Agricultural disruptions would affect export earnings, while energy shortages could undermine industrial production. These sectors collectively employ millions of Pakistanis, meaning water flow disruptions could translate into significant socioeconomic challenges.
The treaty’s suspension creates investment uncertainty for water-dependent infrastructure in Pakistan. Projects currently under development may face reassessment of their viability if water availability becomes less predictable, potentially deterring both domestic and international investment.

6.4 Technical Feasibility of Flow Curtailments

India’s capacity to choke flows from Western rivers is constrained by its existing reservoir volumes: Salal (690 MW; 260 × 10³ acre-ft storage), Baglihar (1.5 MAF pondage across two stages), and the under-construction Ratle (0.079 BAF). At peak spring and summer flows (>20 MAF/month), these reservoirs can only detain a fraction, insufficient for long-term cutoff. However, strategic timing of flood releases and data withholding could produce short-term shortages and undermine Pakistan’s monsoon irrigation schedules.

6.5 Political and Psychological Dimensions

Beyond physical impacts, treaty suspension signals India’s willingness to weaponise water, a pressure tactic rarely seen among nuclear-armed neighbours and may sow domestic anxiety in Pakistan, forcing policy shifts toward diversified water sources or expedited dam construction in Azad Kashmir.

7. What could be the Symbolic or Substantive Impact of this Suspension?

7.1 Legal Constraints on Unilateral Action

While India has suspended the treaty, significant legal questions surround its ability to unilaterally alter the agreement’s implementation. Article 12(4) of the treaty explicitly states that termination requires written consent from both parties.
The treaty contains no provision permitting unilateral suspension, which has prompted Pakistani legal experts to characterize India’s action as a violation of international law rather than a legitimate suspension.
The World Bank’s role as guarantor adds another layer of complexity. As the treaty’s broker and guarantor, the World Bank may play a significant role in addressing the current situation, potentially limiting India’s unilateral actions through diplomatic and financial leverage.

7.2 Practical Implementation Challenges

Beyond legal considerations, there are practical limitations to how quickly and extensively India can alter water flows. Major infrastructure modifications would require time to implement, and India’s own domestic water needs in states like Punjab and Jammu & Kashmir create political constraints on extreme measures.
The existing hydroelectric infrastructure on the western rivers was designed within treaty constraints. While India may now consider redesigning these projects, such modifications would require substantial time and investment before materially affecting downstream flows.

7.3. International Relations Implications

India’s decision creates potential precedent concerns that extend beyond bilateral relations with Pakistan. By unilaterally suspending a major international water treaty, India potentially undermines its position regarding other water disputes, particularly with China over the Brahmaputra River.
If India justifies blocking Pakistani rivers, China could potentially exploit this precedent to justify obstructing the Brahmaputra’s flow, which provides a third of India’s irrigation needs.
The international community’s response will be critical in determining whether this move strengthens or weakens India’s position. Water security is increasingly recognized as a fundamental global concern, and unilateral actions affecting transboundary rivers attract significant international scrutiny.

8. How India Could Intensify to Make Suspension More Impactful?

8.1 Accelerating Infrastructure Development.

India could substantially increase the impact of its treaty suspension by accelerating development of previously planned water infrastructure projects. With treaty constraints lifted, India may fast-track projects like the Ujh Dam and complete modifications to the Kishanganga and Ratle hydroelectric projects that were previously contested by Pakistan.
Projects like Pakal Dul (1.5 MAF), Kiru (624 MW), and Lower Kalnai (850 MW) would cumulatively enable India to withhold up to 5 MAF, exacerbating dry-season scarcity.
India could also prioritize infrastructure that maximizes its utilization of the eastern rivers, preventing surplus water from these rivers from flowing into Pakistan. The Shahpurkandi Dam, completed in 2024, and other potential projects could collectively reduce the estimated 9.3 billion cubic meters of surplus water annually flowing to Pakistan from these rivers.

8.2 Storage Development on Western Rivers.

Perhaps the most impactful potential measure would be developing significant storage capacity on the western rivers. While the treaty previously limited India’s storage capabilities on these rivers, the suspension removes these constraints. New storage facilities would give India unprecedented control over water timing and volume, significantly enhancing leverage over Pakistan just like China’s plans on Brahmputra River in Tibet.
Engineering studies indicate that India has substantial untapped potential for storage development in the upper reaches of the Indus, Jhelum, and Chenab rivers. Exploiting this potential would represent a fundamental shift in the regional hydro political balance, creating permanent strategic advantages for India.

8.3 Information Sharing Cessation.

India could cease sharing hydrological data with Pakistan, which would significantly impair Pakistan’s ability to plan for water availability. Without advance information about upstream conditions, Pakistani water managers would face increased uncertainty about expected flows, complicating agricultural planning and reservoir operations.
Suspending flow and reservoir-level data exchange, mandated under Article III, would blind Pakistan’s irrigation planning, raising crop-failure risks.
This measure could be implemented immediately without requiring infrastructure development, making it a potentially quick-impact option compared to physical infrastructure modifications.

8.4. Altering Release Schedules: Prioritizing electricity generation over treaty minimum flows during lean months could reduce downstream guarantees from 9 m³/s to treaty floor.

8.5 Legal Standoff on PIC Reports: Refusing to convene PIC annual meetings or publish reports would erode institutional trust and invite Pakistani unilateral riparian measures.

9. How Pakistan Could Be Affected with these Actions?

9.1 Agricultural Production Disruptions

The most immediate and severe impacts would likely be felt in Pakistan’s agricultural heartland in Punjab and Sindh provinces. These regions depend overwhelmingly on irrigation from the Indus system, with millions of farmers relying on predictable water supplies for crop planning.
Key staple crops like wheat, rice, and cotton would face particular vulnerability to water disruptions. These crops not only form the foundation of domestic food security but also represent significant export commodities. Reduced yields could trigger food price inflation and export revenue declines, creating cascading economic effects throughout Pakistan’s economy.
Pakistan’s irrigation infrastructure was developed based on expected water availability under the treaty. Substantial flow reductions could render portions of this extensive canal system ineffective, requiring costly modifications or leaving certain agricultural regions unable to maintain current production levels.

9.2. Water Storage Limitations

Pakistan’s water storage capacity is significantly constrained compared to other major agricultural economies. With limited reservoir capacity to buffer reductions in river flow, Pakistan has minimal resilience against supply disruptions. This structural vulnerability magnifies the potential impact of any changes to the regular flow regime of the western rivers.
The timing of water availability is often as critical as the total volume. Agricultural planning depends on seasonal flow patterns, and any disruption to these patterns could force significant adjustments to cropping patterns and agricultural practices across Pakistan.

9.3 Geopolitical and Social Stability Risks

Water scarcity could potentially exacerbate social tensions and instability within Pakistan. Historical evidence from other regions suggests that water stress often translates into increased social conflict, particularly in agrarian societies with limited adaptive capacity.
The Pakistani government would face considerable domestic pressure to resolve any perceived water aggression from India. This dynamic could escalate bilateral tensions beyond water issues, potentially affecting security cooperation, trade relations, and diplomatic engagement.

11. Conclusion: What is the Strategic Assessment and Future Trajectory?

India’s decision to suspend the Indus Waters Treaty represents a significant escalation in its approach to Pakistan following the Pahalgam terror attack. While characterized as a temporary measure contingent on Pakistan’s actions against terrorism, the suspension creates unprecedented uncertainty in a water-sharing arrangement that has endured through multiple wars and crises.

The immediate practical impacts may be limited by existing infrastructure constraints and seasonal factors. However, the long-term strategic implications could be substantial if India proceeds with accelerated infrastructure development on both the eastern and western rivers. Pakistan’s structural vulnerability to water disruptions with its agricultural economy, energy production, and social stability all heavily dependent on the Indus system, creates asymmetric leverage that India could potentially exploit.

The international legal dimensions remain complex. While India has asserted its right to suspend the treaty in response to terrorism, international water law generally disfavours unilateral actions affecting downstream countries. The World Bank’s role as introduces another variable that could influence how this situation evolves.

Ultimately, the suspension’s impact will depend on whether it represents a temporary pressure tactic or signals a fundamental shift in India’s approach to transboundary waters. If the former, resolution might come through renewed counterterrorism commitments from Pakistan. If the latter, the region could be entering a new era of water contestation with profound implications for stability, development, and bilateral relations in South Asia.